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Abstract 
Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa has been transforming in the 
economic, political and social spheres. This largely peaceful democratic transition 
sought to dismantle the apartheid system of institutionalised racial segregation and 
extend the status of a common citizenship and equal enjoyment of rights to all South 
Africans, regardless of race, gender or religion. Despite the establishment of 
democratic institutions and the inclusion of social and economic rights for all citizens 
in a complex map of policy frameworks, South Africa remains one of the most 
unequal societies in the world. The education system, characterised by a crisis in 
quality, persistent inequality of access and fragmentation in achievement levels, 
further reflects this trend (Badat, S & Sayed, Y 2014; Van Rooyen & le Grange 2003; 
Deegan 1999). In the post-apartheid period, public debate has arisen around the 
socio-economic rights of citizens in the allocation of resources and access to basic 
services such as education. Crucial to the democratic transition in South Africa have 
been the political parties – articulating and aggregating the interests of the populace 
as well as developing and promoting policies for change (Matlosa 2007). This article 
seeks to address this gap by providing a detailed analysis of the education policy of 
the opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). To this end, it scrutinises the 
ideological underpinnings of their education policy framework and the policy ideas 
and strategies proposed. The article begins by contextualising the research in 
relation to the literature related to education policy and political parties. This is 
followed by a description of the educational context in South Africa and of the 
Democratic Alliance (DA). The emergent education priorities and approaches of the 
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DA, with reference to citizenship and in effecting redress and equity in relation to the 
role of the state, is then discussed. The article concludes by reflecting on the 
significance of its findings for education research and policy. 
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Political parties and their education policies are underpinned by ideologies that have 
direct consequences for sustaining or eroding education as a public good in South 
Africa. The idea of diversified systems of education provision in which the non-state 
actors play a role in public education provision has been strongly advocated by various 
international and national organisations. Such views resonate in the local context, as 
in the case of South Africa with the views of political parties such as ruling Democratic 
Alliance (DA) policies in the Western Cape province, a province which is described in 
the influential McKinsey report as a ‘promising start’ among 20 school systems around 
the world (Mourshed et al. 2010). The local policy contextualisation of such a policy 
agenda trajectory, which re-frames the role of the state as an actor amongst others in 
the provision of public goods such as education, was re-affirmed in a policy speech by 
DA leader Mmusi Maimane in parliament in 2017:  
Another idea which has been piloted with great success by the DA government 
in the Western Cape is our Collaboration Schools, where public schools 
operate in partnership with non-profit organisations and private-sector sponsors 
to improve management, governance and teaching and learning in schools. 
We’d look to roll this out this nationally once we are in government. 
(http://www.polity.org.za/article/da-mmusi-maimane-address-by-da-leader-
ahead-of-the-presidents-state-of-the-nation-address-sona-in-parliament-this-
thursday-cape-town-08022017-2017-02-08) 
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This agenda as a global agenda is cast as a pragmatic response to under-performing 
public schools (themselves a consequence of neo-liberal attrition) to legitimate 
market-based solutions to public service provision and consistent with what Ball 
evocatively and aptly describes as part of a ‘neo-liberal imaginary’ (Ball 2012). The 
Democratic Alliance ruling party in the Western Cape province of South Africa 
positions itself as an advocate of non-state, increasingly performing a central role in 
finding solutions to under-performing public goods (education), but managed and 
regulated by the provincial state. Within this ‘neo-liberal imaginary’ the DA has a 
clearly-articulated but unrealised policy agenda based on social liberalism – the limits 
of which are evident, however, in the failure of the DA to transcend an ameliorative 
strategy of educational re-dress and which leaves intact the racialised, structural 
inequalities of public education provision in the province it rules. This article engages 
the complexity of the form this takes, drawing on policy documentation and interviews 
with key DA informants. It focuses in particular on the DA’s education policy vision and 
its strategies and critically examines its advocated policy approaches aimed at 
effecting redress and equity in relation to the role of the state. 
The article begins by locating the DA in the politics of the transition from the apartheid 
social order. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa has been transforming 
in the economic, political and social spheres. This largely peaceful democratic 
transition sought to dismantle the apartheid system of institutionalised racial 
segregation and extend the status of a common citizenship and equal enjoyment of 
rights to all South Africans regardless of race, gender or religion. Despite the 
establishment of democratic institutions and the inclusion of social and economic 
rights for all citizens in a complex map of policy frameworks, South Africa remains one 
of the most unequal societies in the world. The education system, characterised by a 
crisis in quality, persistent inequality of access and fragmentation in achievement 
levels, further reflects this trend (Ahmed et al. 2007; Van Rooyen & le Grange 2003; 
Deegan 1999). In the post-apartheid period, public debate has arisen around the 
socio-economic rights of citizens in the allocation of resources and access to basic 
services such as education. Crucial to the democratic transition in South Africa have 
been the political parties – articulating and aggregating the interests of the populace 
with developing and promoting policies for change (Matlosa 2007).  
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The 13 political parties represented in South Africa’s National Assembly have 
contributed a variety of education policy platforms. There has, however, been a limited 
account of rights, equity and participation among these policies, and their bearing on 
developing a better education system has been noted in the literature (Sayed & 
Soudien 2005). There has been little scholarly research in South Africa that analyses 
proposals of political parties, particularly the opposition parties, addressing their 
implications for equity and quality in education. While previous research on 
educational policy has discussed curriculum and teaching in South Africa (Chisholm 
2005), equity and policy issues, including decentralisation (Sayed 2010), privatisation 
(Motala 2009) and leadership, none have looked explicitly at political parties. This 
article seeks to address this gap by providing a detailed analysis of the education 
policy of the opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). To this end, it scrutinises 
the ideological underpinnings of their education policy framework and the policy ideas 
and strategies proposed. This examination is based on an 18 month SANPAD-funded 
research project, entitled Effecting Social Citizenship through Social policy: Policies, 
Contestations and Practices, undertaken in South Africa between 2011 and 2013. The 
study was conducted by a team of collaborators from Rhodes University, the Cape 
Peninsular University of Technology (CPUT) and the University of Sussex. Analysis 
involved the interrogation of parties’ key policy documents, which was then 
complemented by interviews with the respective parties’ policy elite to reveal the 
breadth and complexity of the policy process. A range of official policy documentation 
related to the party was collected for analysis, primarily official policy documents but 
where relevant and explicatory also official party policy position press statements, 
media articles, blogs and the party’s official website. A total of 20 interviews were 
conducted with DA national-level members and members at provincial and local level 
in the Eastern Cape Province.  
This article begins by contextualising the research in relation to the literature related 
to education policy and political parties. This is followed by a description of the 
educational context in South Africa and of the Democratic Alliance (DA). The emergent 
education priorities and approaches of the DA, with reference to citizenship and in 
effecting redress and equity in relation to the role of the state, is then discussed. The 
article concludes by reflecting on the significance of the findings for education research 
and policy. 
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Education policy and political parties 
There are multiple and competing meanings attached to the terms ‘policy’ and ‘policy 
making’ and while little consensus exists it is generally agreed that policies are highly 
contested, value-laden, dynamic and a product of various compromises (Ball 2008; 
Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). Whilst there has been a government-centric focus on the past, 
evidenced by definitions such as Dye’s (1992 in Rizvi & Lingard 2010: 4) ‘whatever 
governments choose to do or not to do’, there is growing recognition that the policy 
domain extends beyond that of the state and includes that of statements and 
manifestos of political parties (Ball 2012; Rizvi & Lingard 2010). In South Africa, 
however, there is very little research that examines the education policies of political 
parties as important policy actors. This is despite the fact that political parties, including 
opposition parties, have been repeatedly acknowledged as critical to democratic 
governance, in solving collective problems and guiding and shaping the direction of 
policy (Dahl 1989; Schmidt 2002). Indeed, much of the literature tends to frame the 
discussion of political parties within the overall theory and practice of democracy (Katz 
& Crotty 2006; Salih et al 2005). They are seen to fulfil a number of democracy-
supporting functions, including aggregating, challenging and representing interests, 
mobilising the public, providing sources of governance, maintaining government 
accountability and making demands on elected officials (Katz & Crotty 2006). In social 
democracies ‘they espouse the promotion of a better socio-economic dispensation for 
the electorate’ (Matlosa 2007: 4). They thus play a critical role in promoting ideas about 
the kind of ‘good society’ that is desirable in a democracy. Operating as strategic 
alliances, rather than as homogenous and coherent entities, political parties comprise 
multiple viewpoints, competing interests, visions and agendas that are constantly 
negotiated and mediated. It is these multiple understandings that this article explores 
and provides a different perspective on the relatively unexplored area of political 
parties and education. Within this framework, the growing strength of the Democratic 
Alliance as the official opposition party in South Africa warrants closer treatment, 
particularly its policy positions on education. The article’s interrogation of DA 
education policy is based on the view that policy concerns the authoritative allocation 
of values through the allocation of resources based on defined ideological choices. 
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Parliamentary governance and the official opposition 
Thirteen political parties are represented in South Africa’s multiparty system, with the 
African National Congress the ruling party in the national legislature. The Democratic 
Alliance is currently South Africa’s official opposition party. The party’s evolution can 
be traced to liberal, breakaway factions from the United Party (UP), which was in 
government between 1934 and 1948 and which was a major opposition party during 
the apartheid period (Piombo 2009). Its historical development since that time involved 
shifting coalitions with various parties, movements and political agendas, including the 
incorporation of the Independent Democrats, a social democratic-styled opposition 
party led by Patricia de Lille (De Lille 2010). The DA currently has 89 seats out of a 
total of 400 in the National Assembly, following the 2014 elections. Since the 2009 
provincial elections it has governed the province of the Western Cape and since the 
2011 local elections it has controlled 13 municipalities as well as four district councils 
(DA 2012b). The DA in the Eastern Cape has six Members of Parliament, six Members 
of the Provincial Legislature, one Member of the National Council of Provinces, 101 
municipal councillors and 25 staff members serving under the Provincial Director 
(DAEC 2012). Statistics from the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa 
in recent years demonstrate that the DA shows an increase in their national vote share 
from 1,7% in 1994 (as the Democratic Party) to 22,3% in 2014 (IEC 2014). 
In the lead-up to the 2009 national elections, the DA introduced the ‘Open Opportunity 
Society for All’ policy platform (DA 2008a: 1). This policy programme also formed the 
basis of the 2014 election. The DA principles espoused in its policy documents focus 
on individual civil and political rights such as freedom of speech, private property and 
universal suffrage. This vision espouses classical liberal ideals of individual freedom 
and the limitation of state power, which are seen to be mutually reinforcing: ‘An open 
society is one where every individual’s freedom is protected by the Constitution. The 
state has no right to tell people how to think and what they may or may not say. People 
are free to do as they please as long as they do not infringe the rights of others’ (DA 
2014).  
Its main education policy document, ‘Preparing for Success: The DA’s Plan for 
Schools that Deliver Real Opportunity’ (DA 2008b, updated December 2013), contains 
six policy proposals: structuring of schools for performance; categories of schooling; 
7 
 
funding school education; teachers; curriculum, learning and evaluation; and school 
environment.  
On 28 July 2012, the DA launched its 8% Growth Plan. Education has been identified 
as requiring ‘special attention as the DA believes the present system is not adequately 
preparing young South Africans for the jobs market’ (James 2012).  
 
Having provided a brief background and context of South African education and the 
DA, the next sections turn attention to some of the key themes emerging from the 
research regarding the DA’s views on education. 
 
The DA policy framework: At the nexus of opposition and government 
The DA has to strike a fine balance in its education policy as both an official opposition 
party and one that governs the Western Cape, one of the larger and richer provinces 
in the country. Research revealed a party that sought to straddle these tensions by 
influencing and challenging national government policy made by the ruling ANC party 
on the one hand and introducing new and modified legislation in the province it 
governs on the other.  
Rooted in its commitment to federalism, the DA’s status as governing party in the 
province enabled it to ‘experiment’ with reforms and influence government policy by 
example. As one interviewee noted: ‘It’s a virtue for the country if we try something 
and it works ... then everyone in the country can benefit, even outside the Western 
Cape, but if the DA fails, it doesn’t harm anyone ... ‘ (interview with DA policy 
researcher, 2011). Its status as provincial government provides muscle to its 
education policy as ‘at some level, crafting policy without government experience is 
just talking, just thinking, its dreams, and its wishes. But once you test it on the ground 
you find out real quick if its utter failure …’ (ibid). The Western Cape Province is 
therefore used as a space where the DA can experiment and put ideas to the test. 
Speaking specifically in this context about education, members of the DA pointed to 
tightening accountability in education through numerous amendments to the Western 
Cape Schools Act in 2010 such as ‘… provision for the visitation and assessment of 
schools for certain purposes; expand the power of the Provincial Minister responsible 
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for education to determine provincial education policy and the power of the Head of 
the Western Cape Education Department to make certain rules’ (Western Cape 
Schools Amendment Act 2010: 1). In the interviews the DA highlighted how they can 
promote their own interest in the national legislative process through the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP) (see RSA 1996) and play a role in shaping national 
policy. 
The process of what is referred to as experimentation challenges the existing semi-
federal nature of South Africa, raising questions about the legislative rule (NDoE 1996) 
that education is a concurrent national and provincial responsibility. As one 
interviewee noted: 
How independent are we here as a government in the Western Cape to run 
education in a way that could perhaps be quite markedly different from the way 
it is run in the rest of the country. Do we have that right? I don’t just mean that 
we can run it more efficiently. But can we run it differently? Does that concurrent 
power, is it that strong? (…) It is my belief, and it is our belief, that that 
concurrent power is very significant for a province. (Interview with DA/WCED 
official, 2011)  
This quote reflects a strategic orientation in the DA that the semi-federal nature of SA 
policy affords space to change and modify national policies to suit its policy agenda. 
This is why interviewees noted that they were concerned with what they see as the 
interventionist approach of the ruling ANC government in the Eastern Cape province. 
While acknowledging the constitutional imperative of intervention in the case of 
systemic collapse, they suggest that this could set a precedent or create a ‘pretext’ for 
national intervention ‘anytime a province seems to be stepping out of line’ (interview 
with DA policy researcher, 2011). Preserving provincial autonomy is seen as the best 
way to address the different socio-demographical needs of a diverse population. DA 
members suggested the government must ‘do its job, intervene, … pull out and leave 
them’ (interview with DA senior parliamentary member, 2011). The DA see the current 
South African state as one that needs to act, but without compromising its commitment 
to provincial autonomy.  
But governing at the provincial level has also brought with it many challenges, not least 
the realisation that implementing policy as an official opposition party is different from 
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critiquing policy. Interviewees spoke about ensuring that they avoided the ruling ANC 
party’s dilemma of inconsistency between what it said at party conferences and what 
it did in government. As one member of the DA policy elite said (Chairperson of DA), 
they could well launch an attack on the outcomes of the school system in this country. 
What they have to bear in mind is that in this province their own party is responsible 
for those outcomes (interview with DA policy researcher, 2011). Similarly, others noted 
that it could be embarrassing if ‘the figures in the Western Cape aren’t great, then it 
silences [you]. You can’t say anything because you don’t want to be embarrassed!’ 
(interview with DA senior parliamentary member, 2011). The notion of embarrassment 
recurs as a metaphor for explaining the tightrope that the DA has to walk as a party 
gaining an increasing share of the electoral vote as reflected in the 2014 elections and 
moving from opposition only to opposition plus governing. This is evident in the 
Western Cape Province, where the DA polled 59,38% of the vote, compared with 
48,8% in the 2009 elections. Its nearest rival in the province, the ANC, polled 32,89% 
in the 2014 elections (compared with 31,5% in the 2009 elections) 
(http://www.elections.org.za/resultsnpe2014/default.aspx). 
The nexus between opposition and governing in the iteration of DA education policy 
reveals the tensions in reconciling an agenda which holds the ruling party to account 
but simultaneously establishes principles and strategies for effective education 
delivery on which the party as opposition is held to account. Specifically for the DA as 
an official opposition and a government of a province of South Africa, the challenge is 
to identify and respond to policy gaps to ensure that its vision of education becomes 
that of the entire country.  
 
Muscular liberalism and walking left in education policy 
The DA’s ‘Open Opportunity Society’ platform is reflective of the combination of 
classical liberalism – the primacy of individual liberty secured through the market – 
with a social liberal commitment to state-provided social services such as education 
and health in the context of the market. In its vision statement, the DA opposes 
attempts by the state to limit the space of individual freedom and indeed ‘actively 
promote the extension of such space’ in order to achieve a utilitarian goal of 
maximising aggregate wellbeing by ‘making the market work for the many, not just the 
few’ (DA 2012a). On their website the DA describes their ‘open society’ (DA 2008a). 
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The ‘open society’ as described on the website espouses ‘individual freedom and the 
limitation of state power’, whereby an individual’s position at birth does not dictate the 
potential outcome of success, but rather ‘your talents and ... your efforts’. The role of 
the state is to create ‘opportunity for citizens, while individual citizens have a 
responsibility to make use of opportunities on offer’; ‘for all’ means regardless of race, 
where ‘people are judged by their character, their effort and their contribution’. It 
recognises, however, that in the South African context there is a need to temper 
untrammelled individualism with a commitment to some form of social welfare 
provision. The provision of social welfare is cast as residualist, consistent with the view 
that the state should not limit individuals’ ability to secure their social needs in the first 
instance through market provision. As the following respondent noted: 
It’s one of the defining elements of the DA, basically it wants the government to 
be as little as possible, but as much as is necessary. Also, the key is that it must 
fulfil a care function. And that is where the market cannot provide for everybody 
something that is absolutely necessary like water, electricity, transportation … 
then the state needs to step in to provide it. So there’s great argument to be 
made for public education, precisely on those grounds (interview with DA policy 
researcher, 2011).  
The previous party leader, Helen Zille, in her 2009 State of the Province speech stated 
that ‘we believe the state has a crucial role to play in socio-economic development. 
We are not free market fundamentalists. By the same token we do not believe that a 
state, with limited capacity, should over-reach itself’ (Zille 2009).  
These views are philosophically consistent with the ‘new liberalism’ of John A Hobson, 
LT Hobhouse and TH Green. Distinctive from laissez faire and classical liberalism, 
social liberalism argued that the state had a formal responsibility to address poverty 
and provide health, education and welfare services within the context of a market 
economy (Freeden 1998; Simhony & Weinstein 2001). Seekings (2000) has traced 
the roots of new liberalism in a South African discourse of social citizenship in the ‘war 
years’ of the 1940s, signified in the extension (albeit racialised) of old age pensions 
by the United Party government of Jan Smuts. The genesis of the DA’s social 
liberalism is partially derived from this history, although unevenly so: United Party 
liberal reformers were also willing to consider radical social policy proposals such as 
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a state-controlled National Health Service, a historical policy agenda that is not shared 
by the DA. 
The DA is an opposition party whose conception of education policy can be 
characterised as centrist, incorporating an uneven combination of social liberalism and 
classic liberalism. One of the interviewees noted that some MPs were ‘far, far right’, 
and that their most ‘objectionable’ rhetoric is usually edited out of outgoing statements. 
This ‘right-wing base’ speaks only to ‘a very limited part of the DA’ – the main base is 
centrist, which the DA policy researcher argued to be ‘more palatable’ to the 
electorate. 
The DA thus seeks to ground liberalism in the South African context in such a way that 
state power is not merely the defence of negative freedoms, as articulated by free 
market fundamentalists such as Milton Friedman (1961) and that there is a need to 
‘walk left’ such that the party ‘… stretches farther to the left than maybe originally 
intended, simply because of the massive need for social welfare’ (interview with DA 
policy researcher, 2011). The current leader of the DA, Mmusi Maimane, asserted in 
a speech in 2016 that ‘the DA is absolutely 100% committed to overcoming the 
structural inequality that makes South Africa such an unfair society’ (Maimane 2016). 
The means to overcoming this identified inequality is, however, a neo-liberal strategy 
that privileges individual effort and a diminishing of the role of the state. This was 
articulated by the DA leader in a speech introducing the DA’s new policy platform 
ahead of the 2017 State of the Nation Address. Described as a ‘Rescue Plan for this 
lost generation’, the policy platform is described as follows (Maimane 2017):  
Freedom, fairness and opportunity will be at the heart of this plan. A policy 
package that puts each young person at the centre of their own development, 
a master of their own destiny ... And they are tired of depending on the 
government for their well-being …They don’t want to be patronised by hand-
outs, and they don’t want to rely on the welfare of the state or the charity of 
others. And this is what our Rescue Plan will set out to achieve – to restore the 
dignity and independence of the millions of South Africans who still find 
themselves locked out of our economy and reliant on the state to survive. 
 
The party positions itself as centrist with a commitment to ‘muscular liberalism’, but in 
a manner that remains fully consistent with a ‘neo-liberal imaginary’. The variant of 
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this liberal ideology traditionally takes the form of social liberalism, which believes a 
limited government is consistent with the provision of targeted social assistance. This 
positioning is not very dissimilar to some of the ideological pronouncements of the 
ruling ANC government, which privileges work-seeking behaviour over receipt of 
(referred to pejoratively as ‘dependency on’) state welfare (social grants) (Maniates 
2012). The separation occurs when it comes to strategies to achieve educational 
equity and redress, as the next section discusses. 
 
Equity and redress as opportunity: The state as an opportunity provider 
The DA’s education policy presents the argument that redress and equity in South 
Africa are about opportunity in education. The role of the state is to ensure that it 
maximises individual freedoms and opportunities in education. For the DA, equity is 
equality of individual opportunity. The ontological primacy afforded to individuals is 
consistent with its classical liberal roots: the individual is responsible for ensuring 
her/his mobility and advancement. The DA’s visions thus assume a meritocratic 
society where individual effort and willingness to innovate and take risks are rewarded. 
The role of the state is to support rather than substitute for individual effort. This 
approach essentially assumes that individual success or failure is largely an individual 
responsibility, divorced from structural considerations and class constraints, and 
stands in contrast to egalitarian arguments for social justice. This vision is articulated 
by the well-worn metaphor of the ‘fishing rod for self-reliance’: 
And we are an opportunity-driven party, for example we will give you a fishing 
rod, give you that opportunity to catch a fish, and not give you a fish and make 
you happy for one day. We want to make you happy for the rest of your life and 
if opportunities are not given, there is no chance for you to develop. … And 
we’ve also said, no matter the circumstances of your birth you can achieve in 
life if those opportunities are given to you’ (interview with senior DA Eastern 
Cape official, 2012). 
Education opportunity is about ‘nurturing self-reliant, capable citizens, able to compete 
with the best in the world’ (DA 2008b: 4). Tellingly, the document, and indeed party 
members were all silent on education’s role in developing a critical citizenry. 
Participation in the labour market is seen as the best solution to individual poverty and 
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national growth, as articulated by the DA policy researcher: ‘for the next three years 
all you’re going to hear from the DA is growth, growth, growth, jobs, jobs, jobs, jobs.’ 
The DA also sees education as vital for developing skills for participation: 
The DA believes … without a good education, you will not be developed … you 
won’t be able to get access to good job opportunities. So that’s another 
opportunity. And we believe you cannot have a lot of illiterate people roaming 
the streets, and if we have a lot of them, we won’t be able to develop that 
economic environment (interview with DA senior parliamentary official, 2011).  
Underpinning the individualism of its education policies is a view that it is not the 
responsibility of the state to redistribute resources. Instead, what is invoked is a 
residual state that acts as a final-instance safety net for those who fall through the 
cracks, but without creating dependency (DA 2008c). The policy statement by the DA 
leader in 2017 reflects continuity of neo-liberal policy thinking in the DA since its 
inception on overcoming state dependency and emphasising commitment to individual 
responsibility and freedom. For the DA the state is considered as operating at a 
distance, it’s the last-instance guarantor of equity for the marginalised. As the following 
respondent noted: 
I’ve got an obligation to cooperate with what is going on in the country. I cannot 
expect the government to do everything for me. You need to take a step, you 
need to make sure that you are doing something so that you can say ‘Hey 
government, this is your role.’ You see? (interview with DA local councillor, 
2012) 
 
Choice and accountability in the education policies of the DA 
The DA proposes a range of public and private choices for education consistent with 
a liberal approach that considers the market equal to the state in the provision of 
education. The value of choice is seen in its ‘Preparing for Success’ Education Policy 
Document (DA 2008b: 4) as comprising ‘raising educational quality, maximising 
affordability, promoting choice for parents, teachers and learners, encouraging healthy 
competitive performance between schools, encouraging innovative solutions to poor 
schooling, ensuring accountability to consumers of education and harnessing all 
available resources for the creation of a system we can all be proud of.’ In its 2013 
education policy framework document ‘Learning for Success: DA Policy on Basic 
Education’ (DA 2013), while making a policy commitment to good-quality public 
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education the DA ‘acknowledge[s] that independent schools relieve the burden on the 
state to provide schooling for all’ and also ‘recognise[s] that independent schools 
expand choice available to all learners. Independent schools broaden the choice of 
parents in terms of the kind of schooling they want for their children. Appropriate levels 
of public funding for various categories of independent schools will make it a more 
affordable option for all learners and save taxpayers’ money in broadening access to 
quality educational opportunities (DA 2013: 19). 
The party’s policy identifies four specific strategies to give effect to these commitments 
that necessitate comment. 
i. Improving overall quality through stringent control and accountability 
mechanisms. 
ii. Decentralising schooling and exercising differential treatment of good and bad 
schools, ‘so that excellence is recognised and valued, and poor performance is 
rooted out’ (DA 2008b: 1). No mention is made, however, of what constitutes 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ schools and how performance is to be assessed according to 
these normative judgements. 
iii. Making bursaries to available to high-achieving, disadvantaged students in 
privatr schools. This strategic policy aim, however, contradicts a professed 
commitment of the DA to addressing ‘structural inequality’ in that it both 
pathologises and individualises the problem of educational access and 
achievement. 
iv. Introducing a voucher system whereby parents can exercise choice, 
‘encouraging healthy competitive performance between schools’ in a quasi-
market (DA 2008b: 4). The ‘voucher’ scheme can be seen as actively privileging 
certain public schools over others without addressing the problems of under-
performing schools, which compounds the problem of differential human and 
financial resourcing of the latter and reinforces rather than addresses the 
inequity within the public schooling system. 
While Robertson (2012) has noted that this agenda and the language used closely 
resonate with an educational agenda promoted by corporate actors within a neo-liberal 
framework, the DA under its current leader is attempting to redefine its social policy 
agenda around a ‘non-racial’ social liberalism. The limits of such ‘non-racialism’ are 
evident, however, in the DA’s policy which differentiates and supports ‘good’ schools 
in contrast with ‘bad’ schools in marginal communities. This policy continues to 
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reinforce racialised educational exclusion, as the schools needing resourced 
interventions are in predominantly black areas which remain scarred by the geo-
spatial inequalities of the apartheid era and thus require more, not less targeted 
resourcing.  
The social liberalism as an ideological framework increasingly informing the vision of 
the DA is furthermore inconsistent with the idea of education as a public good. The 
most telling reflection of this is its advocacy of vouchers for education provision as the 
mechanism to give opportunities to poor students by incentivising individual 
advancement and competitiveness in a quasi-market: 
One of the redress initiatives is to say that we need to …give learners an 
opportunity by allowing them to have … education vouchers. You say to a child 
from Gugulethu, here’s your voucher, right, you go and buy the best schooling 
with this voucher (interview with DA senior parliamentary officer, 2011). 
The idea of vouchers is premised on the assumption that competition produces 
efficiencies in education and ‘parents and pupils would exercise their preferences by 
voting with their feet, and their vouchers’ (DA 2008b: 9). The DA’s Education Policy 
Document (2008b: 5) elaborates on this scheme: ‘To further increase the options 
available to poor parents, every school will be required to accept a minimum 
percentage of non-fee-paying pupils. In addition, the DA will institute a nation-wide 
bursary voucher program aimed at giving the most academically promising 350 000 
children from low-income families the opportunity to receive a better school education.’ 
This would give opportunities to only 1,8% of the 19 million school-age population 
(DoSD 2012). Vouchers are thus a mechanism of redress for the DA, as they improve 
access to good-quality education for disadvantaged groups, with priority given to the 
hard-working and ‘academically promising’ poor (DA 2008b: 5). The notion of 
vouchers in this approach brings together the DA’s ontological ideal of individual effort 
and redressing disadvantage and has the effect of framing education as a ‘positional 
social good’ whose worth depends to some extent on its perceived value and on others 
having less of it (Olssen et al. 2004: 206). The extent of commitment to such an elite 
model of educational provision at the cost of further radically diminishing under-
resourced, ‘poor performing’ schools is starkly reflected in the position of Maimane 
(2017) as follows:  
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This [voucher scheme] will give poor parents the financial power to take their 
kids out of a school that does not perform and into a school that does. This, in 
turn, will foster healthy competition amongst schools to attract learners. Under 
this system, only schools that provide our children with a decent education will 
survive. 
The notion of choice coupled with a commitment to decentralisation is further evidence 
in the argument of the DA that the state should enable high-performing schools to self-
manage. This rationale was articulated by one of the interviewees drawing on the 
liberal metaphor that ‘it’s a smart government that knows when to row and when to 
steer’. Extending this to schools, he noted that the DA is doing a ‘good job, getting 
schools to row’ (interview with DA/WCED official, 2011). Schools that are high-
performing will under a DA government be ‘required to develop and implement their 
own performance evaluation systems. The Department of Education should not 
impose any system on these schools, but should merely issue guidelines, provide 
deadlines and ensure that the outcomes are made available to the department. 
Inspections by official inspectors would be made only on the specific request of an 
interested party’ (DA 2008b: 26). This largely laissez faire approach to school 
governance is inconsistent with a responsive governance striving at equity and which 
is sensitive to the range of problems in schools related to school cultures which do not 
validate the cultural experience and preference of black learners, as reflected for 
example in the struggles of black learners to wear their hair according to their cultural 
preference (News24 2016).  
For poor-performing schools the DA proposes tough surveillance mechanisms (DA 
2008b: 6-7). To quote the policy document, schools achieving less than 60% pass 
rates in matric 
will be subjected to external review by the Department of Education. This will 
involve visits by school inspectors to class-rooms, interviews by inspectors with 
teachers, principals and learners, and the compilation of a detailed report on 
each of these schools analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the school 
as a whole, as well as the individuals within it’ (DA 2008b: 26).  
The focus is therefore on efficiency, performance and quality that will be realised 
through encouraging ‘healthy competitive performance between schools’ and 
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elaborate school performance management principles. Power will be decentralised, 
performance reviews and audits utilised, the deployment of ‘dysfunctional schools task 
teams’ and financial incentives for good performance by teachers at poor schools. 
Financial penalties will be imposed on poorly-performing schools and rewards of 
greater independence and accreditation accorded for individualised performance 
targets. 
The DA unsurprisingly views private schooling as a democratic right. In its policy 
document it states ‘as a matter of principle, a democratic country should recognise the 
right of parents to choose not to use state schools’ (DA 2008b: 9). The party promotes 
legislation that allows the private system to expand as well as offering state subsidies 
on a sliding scale to allow private schools, described as ‘providing the kind of 
education wanted by parents and pupils’ to ‘flourish’ (DA 2008b: 9). In this sense, the 
DA is not far from current government policy on private schooling. 
Stratifying schools as proposed by the DA cements a two-tier system of schooling 
(Badat & Sayed 2014), with the best pupils in poor schools creamed off through the 
voucher system. In setting up a differentiated performance management system for 
high and low-preforming schools, the DA effectively uses the policy of education 
decentralisation to create a dual system of expectations, unproblematically proposed 
as a way of achieving overall quality, whereby high-performing schools are given 
greater autonomy and rewards, whereas those that do not perform well are put under 
stringent management control. The inequalities that are likely to result are not 
perceived as a problem, as the following lengthy extract makes clear: 
Interviewee: We’ve got a two-tier education system. I’m not shy to say that. 
Look at all the ministers’ children, and my children. Not one of our children go 
to a no-fee-paying school. Because whether we stay in the rural area or not, we 
see the difference in quality.  
Interviewer: What is the DA’s position on that?  
Interviewee: We believe that is appropriate. We believe in high-quality 
education. Unfortunately, you cannot offer high-quality education in all the 
schools; you can strive to offer quality, but not to the extent that you want to 
offer. And those types of education are unfortunately only offered in selected 
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schools, because of the available resources. (interview with DA Eastern Cape 
senior official, 2012) 
More choice perpetuates entrenched inequalities. There will be increased social 
competition for limited educational resources and privileged schools at the cost of 
social justice. 
One of the key discourses and ‘defining features of virtually every DA proposal or 
policy’ (interview with DA Eastern Cape parliamentary member, 2012) is that of 
accountability. Greater accountability at all levels of the system is viewed by the DA 
as a key mechanism for ensuring effective policy implementation, the rationale being 
‘if people, we believe, are not held accountable, it gives rise to corruption, an 
acceptance of low performance’ (interview with DA senior parliamentary member, 
2011). For schools and teachers, accountability is offered as the panacea for the 
education crisis: 
And one of the key issues that came out of the opposition process, holding 
government accountable, is then to see how that works on a local level. And so 
one of the things that we have found in education here is that we have very 
weak schools, weak performing teachers, unaccountable principals. There was 
not very much accountability built into the system as far as we could see. But 
when it was, it achieved very high results. … We found that when certain 
administrative mechanisms were in place and there was a person that could be 
accountable for that, hold others accountable for that, it worked quite well 
(interview with DA Eastern Cape senior official, 2012). 
In order to ensure accountability, a number of ‘administrative mechanisms’ and 
regulatory systems are proposed, including school reporting systems, standardised 
testing, performance agreements for principals and targets for provinces and schools 
justified within a discourse of new managerialism that appropriates technicist language 
from the business sector. Targets are seen as ‘pull factors’ (interview with DA policy 
researcher, 2011) to increase standards overall. In this target-oriented system, 
children undergo standardised testing in grades three, six, and nine before writing final 
matriculation. In a sense, good-quality education in the view of the DA could be seen 
as an achievement-oriented culture of tests and exams. 
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We believe that teachers should be retrained on an annual basis to see that 
you still have a grasp for the content of your subject. We send teachers to the 
classrooms, we don’t know if they are performing or if they are meeting the 
anticipated outcomes (interview with DA policy researcher, 2011).  
Creating a deregulated labour market in which schools control their own 
budgets, pay scales and employment conditions was described as vital for 
dissolving perceived ‘capture’ by national trade unions and consequently 
weakening their power to bargain. 
The issue is about balancing the educational needs of children as the Constitution 
requires with the employment and labour rights of the professionals who must deliver 
the service. And it’s just our belief that in fact the pendulum has got stuck a bit far on 
one side (interview with DA/WCED official, 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
This article has examined the education policy positions of South Africa’s opposition 
party, the Democratic Alliance, focusing on its education policy vision and its strategies 
and approaches to effecting redress and equity in relation to the role of the state. 
Specifically, the article has considered the ideological underpinning of DA policy as 
evidenced in their policy texts and in the views of key policy officials and leaders in the 
party that collectively present its education policy ensemble. It has argued that many 
of the education strategies and approaches advocated are a form of muscular social 
liberalism which steer a fine balance between classic liberal theory and a recognition 
of the need for state intervention in social policy given the specificities of the south 
African context and in particular the need to address the historical legacies of the 
apartheid system.  
The DA’s education policy resonates with the current global discourse of education 
reforms involving decentralisation, choice and rolling back state and consumer power 
(Ball 2006). This is tempered by its acknowledgment of the apartheid legacy on 
education in the South African context. In terms of the state’s role, the DA’s rhetoric 
breaks with the state vs. market approach typified in right/left political positioning, and 
rather advocates for a more active role for government in education. This is not only 
in the traditional liberal sense of ensuring market functioning, but in a redistributive 
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sense of creating access opportunities. This position is not, however, contoured on an 
inclusive concept of social justice, but based rather on technocratic goals of setting 
minimum standards and improving access for the disadvantaged. 
The DA as such reframes redress in the language of individual opportunity and its 
‘equal opportunity’ approach implies a selectivity rather than universality towards 
educational provision, consistent with a liberal vision of meritocracy. Considering the 
historical marginalisation, and deep contemporary divisions in South Africa, their 
education policies would most likely selectively improve access to better-quality 
education for those who can afford it and further entrench inequalities. As Bentley & 
Habib (2008: 12) suggest, ‘to leave access or competition (at the social, economic and 
political levels) to the market would simply reproduce the historical disparities of our 
past’. In the DA’s proposed system, notions of education as a social good are wedded 
to an ideological framework which is consistent with a more active liberalism traceable 
historically to a tradition of social liberalism. The article further reveals the need for a 
more nuanced and sophisticated theoretical account of the conceptual framing by the 
DA of their education policy if the variant of its neo-liberal policy framework and its 
impact is to be understood. It therefore cautions against a simplistic critique of the DA, 
arguing for a more historicised and contextualised account of the policy positions of 
SA political parties in academic and public policy discourse. 
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